The Sad State of Metrics
If you think Risk Management is a term that’s been beaten and abused, the state of “metrics” is even worse.
Dear readers, I’ve been doing some research in the name of our little blog journey together (Ok, not really just for you, I have had other motives). For the past year, I’ve been trying to find out all I can about what people are doing right here, right now, about metrics.
The answer? Not a lot. And what most of us are currently reporting is such a major disservice to our industry that it’s almost better that we don’t even try. Seriously.
What I’ve done is read Jaquith’s book, I belong to the mailing list, I’ve talked to several organizations. What I have found is a similarity between the current state of Infosec metrics, and something else I’m passionate about, baseball. If you’ve read Moneyball, you know where I’m going. If you haven’t, that’s OK too.
The influence of big money into baseball has lead to a “metric” revolution in measuring the productivity of players. In baseball, the key is to measure how the individual performance of players on offense and defense, contribute to the won/loss record. Fortunately for baseball statheads - wins and losses are directly correlated to two simple things - the production or prevention of runs. By throwing out the old stats and focusing on what does correlate to runs, a whole different perspective on the game has been obtained. That perspective lead to a competitive advantage. The Oakland A’s have been consistently competitive for the past 8 years - against teams with 2x to 5x their payroll. So now, gone are archaic metrics like Batting Average and RBI - enter the land of VORP and WARP(3). In this new baseball, Moneyball, a player is measured by how much they contribute to either producing and/or preventing runs. Why? Runs produced or prevented mean wins, and wins mean fans, and fans mean money.
From what I’ve seen, we’re still all caught up in measuring our equivalent of “old stats”, like baseball’s RBI. As I’ve asked around, most metrics we’re collecting and reporting are vulnerability management and A/V statistics. They are, after all, easy to record and report on. Heck, I’ve even seen InfoSec groups report “patch management” stats as the sole indicator of business value into a Fortune 500 ERM framework.
Here’s the problem. Assume the person across the table, your boss, knows nothing about Nessus, Patch Tuesday, or integrating security into the SDLC. If you report to him that you are “patching 98% of critical systems within 35 days as per policy” what do you think your boss just heard?

Now hopefully your boss is a little sharper than the PHB above. Even if they aren’t, metrics like “patch management” aren’t naturally in their business vocabulary. There isn’t a direct correlation there to what does matter to them, money. So they when we speak, they tend to hear the business equivelant of the teacher from Charlie Brown TV specials (”mwaah, mwah, mwaah, mwah mwaaaah”).
THE MARRIAGE OF RISK AND METRICS
You remember Robert Fort - CIO at Virgin US, and his quote from yesterday? His assertion is that PCI doesn’t help him do his job, sell records CD’s. You and I together cut through the article-speak to understand what he’s really saying here - Information Security doesn’t help him sell MP3’s CD’s.
Which, of course, is counter-intuitive to you and I. I hear you say, “Of course we help you sell music, because if we didn’t - then Robert would pull all his firewalls out and sell them on eBay.” And you’re absolutely right. The problem is, nobody’s told Robert in his own language.
Ladies and Gentlemen, Boys and Girls, there are only two categories of IRM metrics that DO speak to non-technical data owners in the language they love. Loss reduction and Risk reduction. That’s it. CIO’s and technical management (like Robert) or the direct boss of the CISO might also be interested in operational efficiencies - but those are more meaningful in light of situational variables (recession, for example), or meaningful only to the CISO. In addition, most of the time the probable impact of operational metrics on profitability is much less than what we can usually express in risk or loss reduction efforts.
But those are the metrics we’re currently reporting, like number of viruses blocked. They DO have some correlation to either loss reduction or risk reduction, to be sure. But in isolation, and expressed independently of their impact on loss or risk reduction, they are practically worthless to data owners.
SO WHAT USE IS PCI?
As we’ve discussed before, PCI is an expression of someone else’s risk tolerance, a risk tolerance that they are asking you to accept and implement. This may or may not match the risk tolerance of your organization, and unfortunately for you, the Card Companies have left the dirty work - selling PCI, up to you. The success of your sales effort is going to be dependent upon whether you can successfully correlate the additional investment in controls and processes to risk or loss reduction. Chances are that much of the PCI standard can mean risk or loss reduction - primarily because the penalties for non-compliance create a feedback loop (a wonderful term used last night by Mike Schiebel) wherein compliance mitigates the risk from it’s own loss factors. Independent of that feedback loop, I’m not so sure PCI is that effective for companies that already take Information Risk Management seriously.Thing is that desired state where PCI doesn’t matter is irrelevant for now if you aren’t one of the lucky who can simply scan and self-evaluate.


rybolov Jun 19
Hi Alex, this is a well-written piece.
Working backwards, this is how I see things:
You can’t manage what you can’t measure
You can’t measure what you can’t define
How do you define something that isn’t known?
Technical things are easy and cheap to measure, usually the tool gives you all sorts of statistics. However, we usually have those problems figured out already–we need metrics for the stuff we don’t know about yet, and that’s where the concept of metrics falls apart.
http://www.guerilla-ciso.com/archives/140
Tripwise Jun 20
I don’t see where the concept of metrics falls apart when dealing with information security. Why doesn’t information security need to be any different from other fields where metrics are well established and considered common knowledge?
ISOs and other risk management professionals seem to focus on the “because we’re different” argument too much. Management gets ‘guns, gates, and guards. They understand the need for security.
Where things fall down, IMHO, is when ISOs and risk management professionals do not take significant effort to REMOVE bits and bytes from the equation when communicating with other management. Don’t focus on being a hero and showing it through the number of “bad guys” you stopped. Being a hero means you’ve lost the risk prevention game and they know it. No one likes a diving save when compared to proper planning and controls that reduce the number of chances for a diving save.
At the end of the day, it comes down to performing ACCURATE assessments of your threat vectors. Vulnerability research is old news, as is impact research. Thoughtfully identify the threats and you can track real world scenarios to dollars at the bottom line.
LonerVamp Jun 22
I thought you might start talking about Virtual Trust and twisting loss prevention into Business Enablement. Whew!
Mark Curphey Jun 25
Spot on. Last year was Risk Management (buit wasn’t). This year is Metric (but isn’t). Its what I heard called “a set of whores draws on elastic string”.
One note to quote “Loss reduction and Risk reduction. That’s it.” Why no cost reduction? This ios one of the very tennants of business, can I do something better, cheaper or something that someone else cant do. If I have to security to a certain level to do business, I want to know if I can do it cheaper for the same performance. This usually boils down to process but I don’t want to be accused of warping the argument with my own beliefs
Alex Hutton Jun 25
Hi Mark!
I think of cost reductions as “operational efficiencies”. I include them here:
“CIO’s and technical management (like Robert) or the direct boss of the CISO might also be interested in operational efficiencies - but those are more meaningful in light of situational variables (recession, for example), or meaningful only to the CISO.”
It’s not well said there, but the point I’m trying to make is that the executive committee will only care about cost reductions when either:
1.) The ability of the IRM group to reduce risk is greater than the risk tolerance of the exec. committee (we’re spending too much on security), or
2.) IRM demonstrates the ability to keep risk the same or less with fewer $$.
Note: I would argue that when IRM budgets are cut, that signals a willingness to accept risk on the part of the business.